This paper tackles security issues for cooperative information systems (CIS) by first identifying the major security requirements for this particular type of information systems, and then discussing the security techniques usually implemented to address these requirements as well as their limitations.
INTRODUCTION
Today, information systems overlap the organizational boundaries. For many organizations, the intra-organizational integration phase is complete (or is going well). In order to access new markets or to benefit from synergy effects enabling to reduce the costs, some organizations choose to merge with other powerful actors of their sector, to ally with partners or even with competitors. More and more activities of the organization also depend on activities realized outside its boundaries. Organizations thus turn now to an interorganizational cooperation phase, for which many benefits in terms of effectiveness are expected. In this context, cooperative information systems (CIS) refer to any information system allowing an organization to cooperate in a usual way with one or more partner organizations such as suppliers, clients, subsidiaries of the group, etc.
In this paper, we tackle security issues for CIS: we first identify the major security requirements for this particular type of information systems, and then discuss the security techniques usually implemented (mastered or not) as well as their limitations.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the context and motivation of our research. Section 3 determines security requirements for twelve CIS identified as representative in previous work. Section 4 synthesizes the security techniques usually implemented to satisfy these requirements and outlines their limitations with respect to the specificities of CIS. Section 5 summarizes the paper results and sketches some directions for future work.
CONTEXT AND MOTIVATION OF OUR RESEARCH
On the one hand, CIS have been classified and analyzed during the last twelve years according to theoretical, structural, functional and economical perspectives (Dagorn, 2009 recapitulates these proposals). Some innovative work appears nowadays around concepts such as interorganizational process efficiency (Saeed et al., 2005) , inter-organizational performance (Straub et al., 2004; Bharadwaj et al., 2007) , interorganizational competitive dynamics (Chi et al., 2007) , inter-organizational knowledge sharing (Apostolou et al., 2008) , etc. But security issues often remain insufficiently considered, and these proposals seem to be inadequately or too weakly supported by existing security frameworks on the technical level.
On the other hand, at the heart of our subject, networked enterprises need CIS able to manage critical and/or large amounts of information in possibly heterogeneous technological environments and computing services. Thus, security requirements between partners are also of major importance on the organizational level: What information will the partners have access to in the CIS? Is confidentiality of transactions ensured…? These issues must be addressed before implementing a CIS. Security issues affect all kinds of CIS and all cooperation levels. For a future partner, the first problem is to know the nature of information it will have to share with the other organizations using the CIS. This concern is particularly relevant for electronic marketplaces, where confidentiality of information transmitted through the CIS is a critical issue. Moreover, even if rules for information access and sharing were defined and accepted by all the partners, an intrusion into the CIS remains possible, which might reveal useful information to competitors (prices, etc.) . This is why we aim to identify some security elements (requirements, protection mechanisms, open questions) for CIS in the next sections.
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
In previous work (Dagorn, 2009) 
CIS Based on Standard or Web Technology
Groupware. A cooperates with B using a groupware. Since all cooperation situations cannot be analyzed here, only generic guidelines (best practices) to ensure security are proposed (Briguet, 2009; Menold, 2009 
Synthesis
The main security requirements related to the CIS identified are summarized in Table 1 . The table shows that CIS operating in heterogeneous environments have generally higher security requirements than CIS operating in homogeneous environments. The most attention should be paid to CIS developed with Web technology (in the lowest part of the table). The security techniques usually implemented to meet these requirements are discussed in the following section.
SECURITY PROTECTIONS
To prevent or counter security attacks on traditional information systems, many hardware devices and software may be deployed by the organizations, for instance the use of a firewall, a demilitarized zone (DMZ), a proxy, an antivirus solution or an intrusion detection/prevention system (IDS/IPS). Some additional techniques like cryptography, biometry or steganography can be employed complementarily. Many generic books on computer security are available (e.g., Anderson, 2001; Cheswick et al., 2003; Lehtinen, 2006) , and the reader may refer to them for more details on the mentioned mechanisms. Thus, only the (logical) techniques meeting the security requirements identified in previous section are developed here.
Usual Security Techniques
Securing A and B. The following techniques may be implemented:
-Deploy a firewall to filter network traffic to the server (block telnet/ftp access) -Implement a routing policy between the partners (e.g., route the network traffic from the partner to the DMZ and not to the local area network -LAN) -Implement authentication mechanisms based on a trust relationship between Windows domains -Install a leased line dedicated to cooperation operations between the organizations (always preferable than using the Internet network).
Securing the Application. This may be enabled by: -Developing the application with secure coding techniques (Howard and LeBlanc, 2001; Graff and Van Wyk, 2003 
Limitations and Issues to Solve
The security techniques developed in this section are, for most, individually well mastered today. However, they are generic, do not take into account the specificities of CIS, and are usually implemented as needed without a cooperation rationale. Hence, security vulnerabilities may persist in the organization's trust architecture. Since it is not relevant to create security techniques and tools specific to CIS, but assuming that future information systems will inevitably go towards greater openness and interoperability (Fenoulière, 2004) , we recommend integrating some of these security techniques in a framework specific to CIS in order to adapt their features to an inter-organizational cooperation context.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Taking into account the latest technological developments and issues in the area of CIS, our research shows in particular that most interorganizational cooperative activities take place today via the Web, and that this practice raises major security issues for the CIS. Therefore, security issues were emphasized by analyzing the security requirements of each CIS identified, and highlighting the limitations of the security techniques usually implemented to address these issues.
A questionnaire survey conducted with ten leading French companies of the sectors of industry, research, banking and insurance, engaged in one or more inter-organizational cooperation processes, confirmed the trend of Web cooperation, the growing issue of Web security, as well as the recent efforts of the organizations to manage their security (through technical protections, security policies that mainly conform to ISO standards, security budget, etc.). It also confirmed our assumption that more security techniques should be implemented when the technological environment of the CIS is heterogeneous (Dagorn, 2008) . Finally, the security requirements and techniques proposed in this paper were validated for each CIS by the concerned organizations.
To complete this research, our ongoing work in this area consists in establishing a security model for CIS, and deriving a security framework for CIS including some of the security techniques described in Section 4.
